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1. Best practices as new form of 
rulemaking
In January 2015, the Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC” or “Commission” or “agency”) 
issued a series of best practices on a very novel 
phenomenon, the Internet of Things (“IoT”). 
For example, the Commission informed com-
panies that they should implement “security 
by design” by building security into their prod-
ucts at the outset as companies design their 
products. (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). 
The Commission also pronounced that com-
panies should delete data after the data served 
its purpose in order to mitigate the harm asso-
ciate with a data breach. Similar best practices 
span across various industries and businesses 
that the FTC regulates. (Federal Trade Com-
mission, 2015). The FTC is not the only gov-
ernment agency that has been engaging in this 
new approach to rulemaking. In fact, “regu-
lation through best practices has increased 
sevenfold in the past ten years in the federal 
government alone, touching every aspect of 
administrative law” (Zaring, 2006).
As a new form of administrative action, 
best practices represent a recommended set 
of goals that an organization should seek to 
meet (Robbins, 2009). At first look, best prac-
tices seem like a benign form of interaction 
between the agencies and the entities at which 
best practices are aimed at. They appear to be 
a form of advice from the regulating agencies 
when compared to a set of rules and regula-
tions that result into fines and penalties if not 
complied with (Zaring, 2006). However, a fur-
ther inquiry reveals that best practices often 
fall short of the ideal, and carry a number of 
potential detriments to customers and busi-
nesses (Zaring, 2006).
This Article examines the underlying le-
gal authority behind best practices as imple-
mented by the FTC by discussing the Internet 
of Things Report, as a recent example of best-
practice rulemaking by the FTC. This Article 
then demonstrates that the publication of the 
FTC’s best practices in the Internet of Things 
Workshop Report (“IoT Report” or “Report”) 
is an attempt to expand the Commission’s rule-
making authority by bypassing congressional 
authority (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). 
(Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914)
2. Background
The FTC’s Rulemaking Authority
Established in 1914, and operating since 
1916, the FTC was granted the authority to en-
hance the operations of the marketplace by po-
licing unfair methods of competition (Federal 
Trade Commission Act of 1914). The rulemak-
ing authority of the FTC falls under the broad 
categories of legislative rules and interpreta-
tive rules (Charles H. Koch, 1983). For most of 
its rulemaking history, the agency had relied 
on interpretive rules. However, in 1962 the 
agency began promulgating substantive rules, 
called the Trade Regulation Rules (“TRRs”), 
through its legislative rulemaking authority 
(Charles H. Koch, 1983). This newly exercised 
authority of the FTC was upheld by the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals in National Pe-
troleum Refiners Association v. FTC (National 
Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC, 1974). 
Extensive lobbying by businesses to restrict 
the rulemaking authority of the FTC following 
the implementation of the TRRs has brought 
about a contrary effect in the years that follow 
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(Charles H. Koch, 1983). In 1975, Congress 
enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act - 
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 
which affirmed the legislative authority of the 
FTC (Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, 1975). 
(Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914) The 
Magnuson-Moss rules specified that in order 
for the FTC to engage in rulemaking, it had to 
first engage in an industry-wide investigation, 
prepare draft staff reports, propose a rule, and 
engage in a series of public hearings, including 
cross-examination. 
Throughout its history, the FTC has been 
criticized for its rulemaking activities, par-
ticularly by business (Charles H. Koch, 1983). 
Businesses have opposed the FTC’s power to 
sanction businesses that commit unfair or de-
ceptive practices (Budnitz, 1997). Partly due 
to this opposition and sound criticism, and 
partly due to the burdensome process that the 
Magnuson-Moss Act required, the agency has 
generally halted a great deal of rulemaking 
(SellerBeware). Moreover, during Chairman 
Miller tenure, common law adjudication was 
favored over rulemaking, which also contrib-
uted to this inactivity in the area of rulemak-
ing by the Commission (Budnitz, 1997).
However, in the recent years, the FTC has 
been given new rulemaking authority in spe-
cific subject matters. When Congress enacted 
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”) in 1998, it explicitly provided the 
FTC with rulemaking authority. Similarly, the 
agency gained rulemaking authority in the ar-
eas granted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
and the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act. Neverthe-
less, the burdensome process of rulemaking 
created by the Magnuson-Moss Act causes the 
FTC to engage in very modest legislative rule-
making, and instead turn to other mechanism, 
mainly the industry guides, best practices, and 
recommendations (Solove, 2014).
Best Practices and the Internet of 
Things Report
Best practices, as well as recommendations, 
guidelines, workshops, and other informal, 
horizontal agency action are a new form of 
rulemaking. Horizontal agency actions refer 
to the phenomenon of multiple federal agen-
cies interpreting and enforcing the same stat-
ute (Sharkey, 2013). For example, unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices are enforced by 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
the FTC, the Officer of Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (Sharkey, 
2013). Although theoretically best practices 
are a voluntary way of coordinating horizontal 
administrative action for all agencies, in prac-
tice, agencies use this techniques to make rule 
that are not always voluntary, not always hori-
zontal, and they do so without going through 
the formal rulemaking process (Zaring, 2006). 
When the FTC engages in best practice rule-
making, it often times does not follow the 
requirements established by the Magnuson-
Moss Act.
One such instance of the FTC’s best prac-
tice rulemaking occurred when the agency 
published the IoT Report in 2015. The IoT re-
fers to “the ability of everyday objects to con-
nect to the Internet and to send and receive 
data” (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). 
Examples include home automation systems 
that can be programmed remotely such that 
it turns on the air conditioner fifteen minutes 
prior to the homeowner’s arrival, or Internet-
connected cameras that allow a person to post 
their pictures online with a single click, among 
others. The IoT Report is a compilation of the 
FTC staff’s views and recommendations for 
best practices in the areas of security, notice 
and choice, data minimization, and legislation 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2015). Because 
the Commission’s staff did not believe that the 
privacy and security risks should be addressed 
through a specific legislation at that time, they 
published the IoT Report (Federal Trade Com-
mission, 2015). In this Report, the FTC pledged 
to engage in the following initiatives (1) law 
enforcement, (2) consumer and business edu-
cation, (3) participation in multi-stakeholder 
groups, and (4) advocacy. The Commission 
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voted 4-1 to issue the IoT report, with Com-
missioner Wright dissenting (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2015). Commissioner Ohlhau-
sen wrote a separate concurring statement, 
and Commissioner Wright issued a dissent-
ing statement. Commissioner Ohlhausen did 
not concur with the par of the IoT Report that 
recommended that companies delete valuable 
data to avoid hypothetical future harms (Ohl-
hausen, 2015). She reasoned that such broad-
based privacy legislation can be overly pre-
scriptive (Ohlhausen, 2015). Commissioner 
Wright criticized the Report for lacking ana-
lytical support to establish the likelihood that 
industry best practices and recommendations 
were more likely to foster competition and im-
prove consumer welfare (Wright, 2015). He 
further argued that the Commission failed to 
engage in a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of 
the Internet of Things phenomenon prior to 
disseminating best practice or legislative rec-
ommendation (Wright, 2015). 
3. Analysis
The nature of best practice rulemaking war-
rants adequate cost-benefit analysis.
Although the voluntary nature of best prac-
tices has been disputed by some critics, there 
is no basis in law for this argument. In in-
terpreting the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), federal courts have found best prac-
tices to be “non-binding,” and thus voluntary 
(UAW v. Chao, 2004). A mere repetition of 
the practice by various market players “does 
not transform the practice into a measure that 
can be challenged [in courts]” (Naiki, 2004). 
The fact that best practices rulemaking is not 
subject to the APA-style rulemaking, such as 
notice, comment, and judicial review, further 
proves the voluntary nature of those measures 
(Zaring, 2006). 
Despite being legally non-binding and non-
enforceable, best practices are not always re-
ceived this way by those whom they are aimed 
to effect. Often, entrepreneurs and businesses 
without the legal acumen to distinguish best 
practice from binding administrative rules, 
are not aware of the voluntary nature of best 
practices. This creates a problem because en-
trepreneurs frequently evaluate whether they 
would be able to comply with the law before 
embarking on a risky venture, such as design-
ing a new software or developing an app. Fur-
thermore, agencies develop best practices, 
recommendations, and guidelines informally, 
but they implement them more formally (Zar-
ing, 2006). This process in itself is generally 
not regulated or subject to oversight by Con-
gress or any other branch of the government 
(Zaring, 2006). Courts do not view failure to 
follow best practices as violations of substan-
tive norms (UAW v. Chao, 2004). Neverthe-
less, this general lack of oversight is problem-
atic because agencies that conduct rulemaking 
through the use of best practices “may do so 
without fear of reversal by the judicial branch” 
nor they do need to fear Congressional over-
sight. Best practices, recommendations, and 
guidelines can therefore be characterized as 
“soft law” because they secure widespread 
compliance without being mandatory (Zaring, 
2006). Therefore, due to the lack of oversight, 
non-reviewable nature, and confusion about 
the enforceability of best practice rulemak-
ing, it is important that there is sufficient level 
of cost-benefit analysis performed before an 
agency issues best practices. 
A cost-benefit analysis will be of a sufficient 
level if it seeks a “full accounting,” meaning 
an assessment of all real-world costs and ben-
efits (Sustein, 2001). The balancing needs to 
be done on the basis of complete and available 
evidence. This cost-benefit balancing requires 
an agency to recognize when a risk is “signifi-
cant” and when it is “de minimis” (Sustein, 
2001). Although the approach of cost-benefit 
analysis has been criticized by some scholars 
(Posner, 2000), it is appropriate in rulemaking 
because it helps agencies “resist demands for 
regulation that are rooted in misperception of 
facts” (Sustein, 2001). Moreover, cost-benefit 
balancing is a powerful tool in protecting dem-
ocratic processes “by exposing an account of 
consequences to public view” (Sustein, 2001).
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Because the IoT Report constitutes best 
practice rulemaking, it warrants a sufficient 
level of cost-benefit analysis.
The IoT Report lists some specific recom-
mendations and best practices for companies 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2015). For ex-
ample, in the data security area the Report 
instructs that companies should implement 
“security by design” by building security into 
their devices at the outset, and that companies 
“must ensure that their personnel practices 
promote good security.” These pronounce-
ments use language that does not make a rea-
sonable layperson believe that the practices 
and recommendations are really voluntary. 
Additionally, the Report directly addresses 
businesses in the relevant industry of the In-
ternet of Things, which carries a significant 
probability that businesses will feel forced to 
comply with them. Therefore, best practices 
can be characterized as a form of rulemaking, 
and the IoT Report can be seen as a way that 
the FTC seeks change without the involvement 
of courts or legislature.
Because the FTC is representing the pub-
lic at large, we need to make sure that its best 
practices and recommendations are actu-
ally serving the interest of the public at large. 
Therefore, this type of rulemaking warrants 
a substantive analysis of the costs and ben-
efits of the practices the FTC set forth in the 
IoT Report. There are serious concerns, as ex-
pressed by Commissioner Wright, about lack 
of support for some of the best practices and 
recommendations found in the IoT Report 
(Wright, 2015). For example, Commissioner 
Wright pointed that the record that served as 
the basis for the IoT Report consisted of a one-
day workshop, the corresponding public com-
ments, and staff’s impressions of the work-
shop and comments (Wright, 2015). If the 
record does not have sufficient information to 
support legislative change, then it should not 
be sufficient to warrant a change through the 
use of best practice rulemaking. In fact, one of 
the main aspects that commentators fault best 
practices with is the lack of methodology or re-
search (Robbins, 2009). In order for an agency 
to have a thorough understanding of the issue 
and various viewpoints, it needs to obtain “a 
representative sample of viewpoints” (Wright, 
2015). While the FTC engaged in some solicit-
ing of various viewpoints of interested parties, 
there is evidence that this was not sufficient 
in this case because of the complexity and 
wide-ranging nature of the Internet of Things. 
While informal rulemakers normally guaran-
tee public participation in the rulemaking pro-
cess, a beneficial characteristic of best practice 
rulemaking, the congregation of parties par-
ticipating in the process is “decentralized, and 
ever changing” (Zaring, 2006). This decentral-
ization is harmful to effective rulemaking, and 
requires a cautious approach from the agen-
cies.
Not only did the FTC base the IoT Report 
on an insufficient record, but also, as Commis-
sioner Wright argues, the Commission failed 
to engage in a rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
before it issued best practices (Wright, 2015). 
The cost-benefit analysis is a critical process 
for the agency to engage in before it dissemi-
nates best practices because otherwise the rec-
ommended practices may actually hinder oth-
er important competing interests (Robbins, 
2009). Ensuring that all the relevant interests 
are weighed against each other, and identify-
ing whether the trade-offs are worth taking is 
the key in designing best practices. Some com-
peting interests include: business prosperity, 
innovation, new or additional employment 
opportunities, investment opportunities, and 
even scientific discovery. This requires the 
agency to apply objective standards because 
as critics recognize: “With the overwhelming 
amount of best practices out there, no one is 
creating an objective standard against which 
to measure the practices” (Robbins, 2009). 
As the Dissenting Statement of Commis-
sioner Wright correctly points out, there is too 
much at stake for consumers given the conse-
quences of the “Digital Revolution” on consum-
ers’ homes, vehicles, and other aspects of daily 
life for the Commission to issue best practices 
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without conducting a sufficient cost-benefit 
analysis (Wright, 2015). The IoT Report high-
lights the danger of disseminating over-inclu-
sive and poorly researched best practices. For 
example, requiring that businesses dispose of 
large stores of data could potentially curtail in-
novative uses of data (Wright, 2015). For ex-
ample, the ability to store data has given birth 
to Slice, a free app that tracks users’ shipments 
based on the invoices from various e-tailers in 
users’ email inboxes in a consolidated man-
ner. Slice uses the aggregated data to esti-
mate shipments of various products. Recently, 
Slice reported that the pre-orders for Apple’s 
iWatch exceeded 950,000 units over the first 
weekend (Lewis). This resulted in an increase 
in stock price of of Apple by approximately 
3%, thus benefitting the shareholders (Google 
Finance). As critics highlight, collecting data 
is “the model of innovation right now,” and 
prohibiting such practice ignores this reality 
(Newman). The magnitude of this cost to the 
businesses needs to be weighed against the 
data protection and security interests that the 
FTC purports to safeguard. 
Although developing policy approaches 
to the Internet of Things is a meaningful en-
deavor, the increased privacy and security 
should be weighed against the impediment of 
legitimate business activity and innovation. In 
other words, the FTC is only justified in pro-
nouncing best practices in the IoT Report if it 
concluded that the magnitude of data protec-
tion and security risks is a more pressing in-
terest than the cost to the businesses. It does 
not appear that the Commission weighed the 
competing interests (Wright, 2015). 
While Commissioner Wright concluded 
that the Report lacked a rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis, Commissioner Ohlhausen disagreed 
only with the scope of the recommendations 
(Ohlhausen, 2015). Specifically, Commis-
sioner Ohlhausen did not dispute the process 
that the Commission implemented to reach its 
conclusions, but rather she criticized the ac-
tual recommendations and best practices that 
the Report endorsed based on the cost-benefit 
analysis performed (Ohlhausen, 2015). Wor-
rying that the Report embodies the “precau-
tionary principle,” Commissioner Ohlhausen 
criticized the Report’s best practices on data 
minimization as “overly prescriptive” (Ohl-
hausen, 2015). Both Commissioner Wright’s 
and Commissioner Ohlhausen’s statements 
highlight the problems with the Commission’s 
dissemination of best practices in the area of 
Internet of Things. 
Examples of the risks of failure to conduct 
a proper cost-benefit analysis, and the risks 
of adopting overly prescriptive best practices 
abound. The disruptive and widely popular 
transportation service company, Uber, dem-
onstrates this precise risk. The company has 
been facing legal challenges in many countries 
for, among other things, providing taxi ser-
vices without the licenses required from other 
taxi operators (Heimler). It appears that in 
majority of foreign jurisdictions, the regulato-
ry agencies or legal authorities did not engage 
in any cost-benefit analysis, but rather found 
Uber’s actions illegal simply because the com-
pany operated without the stringent prereq-
uisites imposed on licensed taxi operators 
(Heimler). However, the services Uber pro-
vides are often more efficient and less costly 
alternatives to traditional taxi cabs (Techdirt). 
With less stringent regulation in the United 
States, the company has been able to operate 
and provide a low-cost, reliable alternative to 
customers of traditional taxi cabs (Heimler). 
Although additional competition may not be 
desired by traditional taxi operators, in cases 
where benefits seemingly outweigh costs, the 
government should allow for customers to 
have this choice. 
Nevertheless, examples of under-regulated 
areas are also not difficult to find. In 2007, 
Samsung launched Internet connected Smart 
TV powered by Google’s Android operating 
system. These Smart TV’s allowed custom-
ers to control and regulate the TV using voice 
commands (Samsung). However, in February 
2015 Daily Beast discovered buried in Sam-
sung’s Privacy Policy that these TV’s were 
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meant to ‘always listen’ and transmit data to a 
third party (Harris). The privacy policy stated, 
“Please be aware that if your spoken words in-
clude personal or other sensitive information, 
that information will be among the data cap-
tured and transmitted to a third party” (Har-
ris). More importantly this data transmission 
occurred through unsecured channels creating 
a possibility of uninvited intrusion by hack-
ers (Harris). This example illustrates the risk 
of inadequate regulation, and highlights the 
need for government regulation of innovative, 
nascent concepts (Fink). Such computer-like 
features in many of the modern devices pose 
serious risks to users’ privacy and data securi-
ty breaches. Although users may enjoy certain 
features and easy access to those devices, the 
need to minimize risk requires that an agency 
balances it against these benefits to the con-
sumers. 
By publishing best practices and recom-
mendations, such as the IoT Report, the FTC 
may be seeking to exert more control in the 
areas of privacy and security than it currently 
holds.
In the absence of specific legislation on 
data privacy and security, the FTC relies on 
its broad authority under Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, which prohibits 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practice in or af-
fecting commerce” to address violations in 
the areas of data privacy and security (Federal 
Trade Commission Act of 1914). In the recent 
years, the agency has engaged in bold efforts 
to stretch the boundaries of its authority over 
data privacy and security (Dennis, 2012). With 
its 2012 victory in FTC v. Wyndham World-
wide Corporation which affirmed that target-
ed data-security legislation did not deprive the 
FTC of authority to assert an unfairness claim 
in the data-security context, the Commission 
has taken yet another step towards becoming 
the enforcer of data privacy and security (Den-
nis, 2012). Despite its relatively successful as-
sertion of authority over these areas, its en-
forcement powers differ from its rulemaking 
powers. Because the FTC’s enforcement of da-
ta-security policies under the unfairness prong 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act was 
greatly criticized (Bender, 2013), the current 
rulemaking in the areas of data privacy and 
security is even more warrantless. Moreover, 
without any specifically defined authority over 
privacy, the FTC could be seen as attempting 
to exert as much broad authority over privacy 
as it has over advertising under Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Therefore, 
without a specific legislation, the Commission 
should not engage in informal rulemaking in 
the areas of data privacy and security. 
This is not the first attempt of the agency to 
overstep the boundaries of its rulemaking au-
thority. For example, when the agency adopted 
the Telemarketing Sales Rule it was criticized 
for attempting to regulate the debt-relief-
services industry using rulemaking authority 
purportedly granted by the Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and the Abuse Prevention 
Act (Thurman, 2010). The criticism was fol-
lowed by a series of lawsuits objecting to the 
agency’s expansionism (Thurman, 2010). As 
this example demonstrates, an agency’s over-
reaching can have detrimental effects. By us-
ing the ambiguity of Section 5 language, the 
agency could be seeking to exert more power 
than Congress sought fit for the FTC. In an 
emerging field, such as the Internet of Things, 
the detriment could be an even more serious 
consequence if the agency’s overreaching con-
tinues.
This form of agency rulemaking should be 
controlled within the agencies themselves.
In today’s world of technological dynamism 
and increased complexity, agencies must de-
pend more on outsiders in how they imple-
ment policy changes (Kovacic, 2015). Seeking 
the view of outsiders to develop understanding 
of the various technologies and their effects 
on consumers is not only permissible, but is 
expected of regulators. The FTC’s initiative to 
gain a better understanding of the Internet of 
Things is therefore price-worthy. If the Com-
mission simply reported on the discussions 
and various points of views expressed in the 
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one-day workshop it conducted, this could 
have been constructive to facilitating proper 
rulemaking process, such as that done by Con-
gress. However, the Commission did not stop 
there, but rather issued best practices and rec-
ommendations based on this very limited in-
quiry into the nascent topic of the Internet of 
Things. 
The dissemination of best practices on the 
Internet of Things differs significantly from 
the agency’s prior informal rulemaking. For 
example, in the 2000s, the Commission en-
gaged in deliberations on the topic of com-
petition and health care (Muris, 2005). The 
deliberations consisted of 27 days of infor-
mal hearings, and featured over 250 panelists 
(Muris, 2005). Another influential study by 
the Commission took 15 years (Muris, 2005). 
Although the record does not need to consist 
of such elaborative and long-term research ef-
forts (Kovacic, 2015), a report based on a one-
day workshop, its accompanying public com-
ments, and the staff’s impressions of those 
proceedings, falls short of a sufficient record. 
After all, development of a fuller, more rep-
resentative perspective requires substantial 
investment, and “tends to press towards larg-
er rather than small proceedings” (Kovacic, 
2015). Therefore, as correctly noted by Com-
missioner Wright in his dissenting statement, 
the Commission did not collect sufficient evi-
dence to issue best practices in its Internet of 
Things Report because it “merely relied upon 
its own assertions and various surveys that are 
not necessarily representative [...]” (Wright, 
2015). 
Best practices form of rulemaking should 
be controlled within the agencies themselves, 
especially because lack of congressional and 
judicial supervision over this informal rule-
making is likely to continue (Zaring, 2006). 
Sometimes this could mean that an agency 
should be willing to leave a field over which it 
has jurisdiction untouched by best practices 
or other form of rulemaking. In other instanc-
es, it could mean that the agency engages in 
elaborate and exhaustive deliberations that 
ensure representative prospective of those 
potentially affected by its new regulation. As 
agencies proceed down the best practices rule-
making path, they should aim for “a cautious 
but intelligent embrace of the phenomenon as 
a tool of administrative policy” (Zaring, 2006). 
This cautious approach is vital because “there 
is no reason to suspect that the substantive 
creations of these procedural innovations will 
necessarily be good ones” (Zaring, 2006). 
4. Conclusion 
By promulgating best practices and recom-
mendations, the FTC may have exerted more 
authority than is provided by Congress. The 
non-reviewability and non-binding nature of 
best practices makes this form of rulemak-
ing an area where it is easy for an agency to 
slip into a territory beyond its jurisdiction. Al-
though issuance of best practice may seem to 
be a harmless action, the confusion that exists 
over an agency issuing mandatory rules as op-
posed to voluntary rules may lead to negative 
consequences, such as lesser innovation and 
lesser economic activity. Given the serious 
costs to the society, the Commission, through 
the IoT Report, might have stepped into a 
dangerous terrain in its misguided attempt 
to increase privacy and security, particularly 
because it failed to conduct a sufficient cost-
benefit analysis. Given the risks of over-regu-
lating nascent concepts, such as the Internet 
of Things, agencies should control their best 
practice rulemaking tendencies. Perhaps re-
straint from rulemaking in favor of free mar-
ket forces could lead to best practices emerg-
ing on their own. 
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